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Abstract: The guarantee relationship refers to the responsibility of an enterprise for another one’s 
financial obligation if that enterprise failed to meet its obligation, thus representing potential risk 
contagion between them. Examining the topological properties of networks formed by such 
guarantee relationships is critical for an in-depth understanding and effective regulations of the 
financial system. In this research, we analyzed the structure and evolution of the Chinese guarantee 
network with five years’ worth of real-world data from 2007 to 2012. We identified the scale-free 
and power-law properties of the guarantee network, and found the global financial crisis and follow-
up economic stimulus program had significant influence on the evolution of guarantee network. In 
particular, both the growth and connectivity of the guarantee network was diminished by the 2008 
financial crisis, and enhanced by the following stimulus program. This research presents data-driven 
insights on how the topological structure of guarantee network is associated with economic policies. 
Results indicate the increasingly vulnerable structure of the guarantee network with economic 
stimulus program, resulting potential risk of cascading failures. 
 
1. Introduction 
  The guarantee relationship between two enterprises refers to the responsibility of an enterprise 
for another enterprise’s financial obligation if that enterprise failed to meet its obligation [1]. 
Through such interdependencies, enterprises are connected as a guarantee network. Loans and 
guarantees could enhance the solvency of enterprises, especially small and medium enterprises 
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(SME), thus facilitates the rapid growth in the economic upturn period. However, potential risks 
could emerge from the binding between enterprises in this guarantee network [2]. As a result, there 
is an elevating risk of cascading failures in the guarantee network during the economic recession 
period. Because of the interdependencies between these enterprises, the failure of one enterprise 
could cause successive failures of multiple enterprises, resulting in serious crisis of the system. 
In 2008, with the breakout of global financial crisis, Chinese government announced the an 
economic stimulus plan worth of RMB ¥4 trillion (US $586 billion) on 9 November 2008 in order 
to reduce the impact of the global financial crisis on Chinese economy. This plan aimed to 
investigate this fund in infrastructure and social welfare by 2010. The credit condition was also 
loosen to help encourage loans from enterprises. This stimulus plan, though successfully sustained 
China’s economic growth and largely stabilized the world economy [3], has resulted in a surge in 
debt in China, and dramatic structural change of China’s guarantee network. There were a huge 
amount of loans going to SMEs, many of which were not eligible for loans before the stimulus plan. 
These SMEs could meet the new credit standard to get loans from banks through guaranteeing each 
other [4]. Although many of these SMEs were saved by these loans, economic studies and critics 
suspected that the stimulus plan could cause explosion of credit debt and trigger future financial 
contagions because of failures of these SMEs. For example, Dr. Yifu Lin, the former chief economist 
and senior vice president of the World Bank, expressed his concern about the bad effect of stimulus 
plan on China’s economy [5]. Other renowned economists, like Dr. Weiying Zhang and Dr. Zhiwu 
Chen, also warned that the stimulus plan would lead to malinvestment, and might not be helpful in 
the long run [6, 7].  
Decision makers also recognized such risk after the surge in debt in 2009, and took some actions 
to regulate the debt behavior. In March 2010, the government work report delivered at the 11th 
National People’s Congress stated that the government planned to improve macro-control 
regulations in 2010. Since then, the People’s Bank of China (the central bank of PRC) increased the 
reserve requirement ratio for five times in 2010 (from 15.5% to 18%). The major change of the 
monetary policy operations occurred on Oct 20th, 2010, when the People’s Bank of China raised the 
interest rates for the first time since the global financial crisis. These regulations and policy changes, 
to some extent, helped reduce the impact of the negative consequence of the stimulus plan.  
In the recent years, such risk led to a number of events of cascading failures among enterprises, 
due to the bad loans and high default rate of these SMEs [8, 9]. For example, Zhejiang, one of the 
richest economic hubs in China, has witnessed a debt crisis in 2012, and resulted hundreds of private 
companies went bankrupt like dominoes, leaving billions of bad debts to banks. The crisis was 
caused by banks collecting debts. Four big companies were unable to repay private loans, which 
were with a high interest rates (over 20%). The failure of these four companies affected 600 other 
companies through the mutual credit guarantee relationships among enterprises. The incident 
dramatically increased the banks’ non-performing loans ratio to a decade high, and forced banks to 
more aggressively call in loans from all involved enterprises, leading to broader corporate collapses.  
  Despite the qualitative critics and studies on the stimulus plan, little is known about the changes 
of the guarantee networks and how these changes are linked to the risk of cascading failures. There 
is a critical need for data-driven quantitative studies of the guarantee network and its associated risk. 
A good understanding of the guarantee network’s dynamic structure could enhance the decision 
making process for economic policy through identifying the potential systemic risks such as the 
domino-like cascades of failures discussed above. However, how to leverage real-world guarantee 
data to model such behaviors and the overall structure of the guarantee network remains a challenge. 
Network science presents a natural and promising way to address the challenge in modeling and 
analyzing guarantee networks. Network science focuses on the interactions between the elements 
of a complex system in order to discover the nature and underlying patterns of interaction 
relationships inside the system. It has been widely applied to model structure or dynamics of real-
world complex systems. Recently, network science has also been applied in finance research. For 
example, network science techniques have already been applied extensively to the global banking 
system [10], international financial network [11], interlocking boards of directors [12-14], corporate 
governance and corporate ownership links [15, 16]. The guarantee interdependencies between 
enterprises can be naturally represented as networks, in which each node represents an enterprise, 
and each (directed) edge represents the guarantee relationship between the two corresponding nodes. 
From such a guarantee network, we can capture the contagion path of obligations and failures. Using 
methods in network science to analyze the networks formed by guarantee relationships could fill 
the research gap in data-driven insights of how the topological structure of guarantee network is 
associated with economic policies and risks, and help decision makers identify the potential 
systemic risks caused by enterprises’ failures (i.e. defaults, bad loans) [17].  
2. Related work 
In the past decade, complex network has emerged as an effective tool to model and study real-
world complex systems of different domains, such as social networks [20, 21], biological networks 
[22-25], Internet [26-28], collaboration networks [29-31] and citation networks [32, 33] etc. 
Recently, there has been a growing interest in applying network science to solving financial 
problems. For example, network analysis has already been applied extensively to investigating the 
global banking system [10], international financial network [11], interlocking boards of directors 
[12-14], corporate governance and corporate ownership links [15, 16]. These studies focused on 
characterizing the topological properties of the financial and business networks, and using these 
properties to interpret the individual and organizational behaviors. They observed a positive degree 
correlation, that is directors who sit on many boards do so in the company of other directors who sit 
on many boards. This positive helps explain the distribution of board interlocks [12]. They revealed 
that the aggregate connectivity of the network is an intrinsic property of the interlock network, and 
resilient to major changes in corporate governance [13].  
Over the past decades, a great deal has been established about the links between topological 
characteristics and robustness of network. We classify these studies into three major types. The first 
one is the analysis of the “robust-yet-fragile” property of networks [34-37]. Within a certain range, 
connections serve as a shock absorber, and risk sharing prevails, so connectivity engenders 
robustness. However, beyond a certain range, the system can flip the wrong side of the knife-edge. 
Interconnections serve as shock-amplifiers, not dampeners, as losses cascade. The second one is the 
“fat-tailed distribution” of networks. In particular, fat-tailed distributions have been shown to be 
more robust to random disturbances, but more susceptible to targeted attacks [37, 38]. Because a 
targeted attack on a hub node can bring most part of the system into a crisis, whereas random attacks 
are most likely to fall on the periphery. The third one is the well-known “small world” property of 
networks [39]. In general, networks tend to exhibit local clustering or neighborhoods. So it will tend 
to increase the likelihood of local disturbances having global effects [40]. Either way, a small world 
is more likely to turn a local problem into a global one. Financial safety is a main concern of 
governments and banks. However, research on the robustness and resilience of financial networks 
is still rare. So our study about the association of topologies and robustness of guarantee network is 
meaningful. 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Data  
In this research, we acquired a comprehensive dataset from China major financial institution. The 
data spans from January 2007 to March 2012, and contains the monthly information for all loans 
extended to the client enterprises, which have a credit line above 50 million RMBs. These loan 
guarantee data are from the 19 major nationwide Chinese commercial banks. This data could 
represent the entire loan guarantee relationships in China. In total, there are about 87900 enterprises 
and 84500 guarantee relationships from January 2007 to March 2012.  
For each single loan guarantee, the data contains information of guarantor enterprise and debtor 
enterprise, and the time of the guarantee relationship. We also have detailed information, such as 
loan amount, asset and liability of the enterprise.  
Our dataset covers two important milestones in the global financial system: The global financial 
crisis caused by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 2008, and the implementation of 
the Chinese economic stimulus program from January 2007 to March 2012.  
3.2. Network construction 
To analyze the structure and dynamics of the guarantee system, we constructed a dynamic 
guarantee networks using the guarantee relationships between enterprises. Figure 1 illustrates the 
construction of the networks. Each node represents an enterprise, and each edge connecting two 
nodes represents the existence of guarantee relationships between the two corresponding enterprises 
in a specific month. An edge goes from the guarantor to the debtor. This dynamic guarantee network 
consists of 63 months of data, enabling us to analyze the evolution and dynamics of the system over 
time.  
                  
                 
Fig. 1. Illustration of the dynamic loan guarantee relationships in the guarantee network 
 
4. Results and discussion 
4.1 Topological and financial properties of guarantee network 
We split the data into four phases:  
• Phase 1 (January 2007 to August 2008). Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. was about to 
bankrupt.  
• Phase 2 (September 2008 to November 2008). Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. failed for 
bankruptcy and caused immediate global financial crisis.  
• Phase 3 (December 2008 to December 2010). China has implemented the four-trillion 
economic stimulus program. The stimulus program ended in the end of 2010. 
• Phase 4 (January 2011 to March 2012). This is the post-economic stimulus program period. 
 
  The topological properties of the guarantee network in four phases are presented in Table 1. 
Despite the increasing size of the guarantee network, there are a set of common static network 
features across four phases: 
  First, the average in-/out-degree is slightly lower than one, indicating that in general, enterprises 
had a small number of guarantors, and did not provide guarantees to others frequently. Both the in- 
and out-degrees exhibit a power-law distribution, with a slope ranging from 3.164 to 3.318, and 
2.315 to 2.846, respectively (Fig. 2), indicating that the guarantee network are scale-free, a property 
that commonly exists in real-world networks [3]. In such a scale-free network, most enterprises have 
a small number of guarantee relationships, while a few hub enterprises provide/obtain guarantees 
to/from many others. A closer examination of the data revealed that a significant portion (14.375% 
compared with the 7.74% of random network, t-test with p-value=0.0017) of enterprises formed 
mutual guarantee relationship without getting involved with the rest of the network. These isolated 
mutual guarantee couples are at the bottom of the whole system in terms of low asset and loan confer 
and high default risk, indicating that high-risk SMEs are more likely to obtain loans with the 
guarantee from similar high-risk SMEs. Here, we define the two hubs: guarantor hubs and debtor 
hub. The guarantor hubs are those giving guarantees to others most frequently (top 1% out-degree). 
The debtor hubs are those obtaining guarantees from others most frequently (top 1% in-degree). We 
found that the guarantor hubs were usually enterprises with large assets, liability, and credit line. 
About 15% of them were listed enterprises, (compared with about 4.5 %, the average listed ratio of 
the whole network). On the other hand, the debtor hubs tended to have medium amount of asset and 
liability, but with high default rate and risk rating. The overlap of guarantor and debtor hubs is rather 
small (15%) as compared with other real-world networks, which indicating guarantor hubs and 
oblige hubs have different characteristics. 
  Second, the giant component (largest WCC) stands for 27.97% of the nodes in the whole 
guarantee network, indicating that the network is more decentralized than most other complex 
networks like social networks [20, 21], biological networks [22-25], Internet [26-28], collaboration 
networks [29-31] and citation networks [32, 33] etc. Within the giant component, we observed the 
small-world effect as indicated by the small average shortest path length (14.55~18.40). In addition, 
the average clustering coefficient is also relatively large (0.57%~1.57%), indicating a strong “a 
friend’s friend is also a friend” effect throughout the guarantee network. 
  Third, we also summarized the basic financial characteristics in Table 1. In general, the average 
debt to asset ratio has been maintained at around 60%, which is higher than the average debt to the 
average asset ratio for listed firms in the network (around 40%). The ratio of listed enterprises was 
relatively low (around 2-5%). The decrease of enterprises’ listed ratio, indicating more and more 
guarantees given by non-listed enterprises. This echoed the above findings of large portion of 
isolated mutual guarantee relationships. We will discuss this in detail in the following section of 
dynamic network analysis. 
 
Table 1. The summary of the topological properties of the guarantee network in four phases 
 Phase 1 (January 2007- Phase 2 (September 2008- Phase 3 (December 2008- Phase 4 (January 2011- 
August 2008) November 2008) December 2010) March 2012) 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Node number, N 37268.05 1417.334 39002 219.2031 48062.35 6425.673 67130.87 4167.02 
Edge number, E 
35959.7 
1271.18589
9 
37436.5 
208.596500
5 
46981.12 
6372.1590
78 
65825.87 
4202.50795
6 
Average out/in-degree, 
d 
0.9649911 0.00377505 0.9598612 
4.63681E-
05 
0.9771918 
0.0060606
11 
0.9804791 
0.00558766
5 
Power-law index of in-
degree distribution, 𝛌𝐢𝐧  
3.4272 0.2703 3.1962 0.0164 3.2279 0.0733 3.2283 0.0385 
Power-law index of out-
degree distribution, 
𝛌𝒐𝒖𝒕 
2.2574358 
0.05378754
5 
2.3515078 
0.00549809
1 
2.7372988 
0.1541648
47 
2.7557222 
0.05425495
4 
Density 0.00002593
3 
1.08167E-
06 
0.00002461
2 
1.39642E-
07 
0.00002069
1 
2.80179E-
06 
0.00001465
7 
8.92188E-
07 
Average clustering 
coefficient (directed), C 
0.00572 
0.00037977
3 
0.01031445 0.0020314 0.0156641 
0.0016613
25 
0.014201 
0.00132287
6 
Size of the largest 
weakly connected 
component (giant 
component), WCC (%) 
10528.05 
(%) 
284.267567
6 
10563.5 
77.0746391
5 
13279.54 
1726.9024
58 
18994.6 
1656.64315
4 
Component number, 
CN 
12083.65 
302.051104
9 
12431.5 
9.19238815
5 
15286.62 
1897.2346
43 
21372.87 
1698.34830
9 
Reciprocity  
(% of isolated 
reciprocal two-node 
component) 
13.9792% 
 
0.251% 
13.5849% 
 
0.1237% 
 
14.7975% 
 
0.4064% 
 
14.3559% 
 
0.352% 
 
Ratio of fully connected 
three nodes 
        
Average shortest path 
length, l 
14.5722195 
0.48251725
4 
14.5477202 
0.08840531
7 
18.0690458 
1.8545913
57 
18.4020096 
0.41467830
9 
Diameter, D 
50.3 
5.96569138
5 
48 
2.82842712
5 
59.6153846 
6.6457620
93 
52.9333333 
2.78943585
7 
Average liability (ten 
thousand) 
128962.84 
7817.60545
1 
145601.45 
1601.78600
3 
159557.48 
27164.437
63 
221876 
125654.331
2 
Average loan (ten 
thousand) 
39766.34 1656.24478 42710.22 349.924649 45261.3 
1260.6137
67 
40770.86 
994.482739
9 
Average credit line (ten 70116.79 8646.77063 72444.77 192.024842 92480.11 9279.2742 97481.02 1565.07258 
thousand) 6 1 98 
Average debt to asset 
ratio 
0.60060 0.0115 0.604619 0.00924 0.60645 0.0752 0.61906 0.03908 
Average ratio of listed 
enterprises 
0.0476106 
0.00160312
2 
0.0456777 
2.43516E-
05 
0.0372983 
0.0053424
71 
0.0274358 
0.00084083
3 
 
4.2 Dynamic analysis of guarantee networks 
Analyzing the dynamics of the guarantee network could reveal the short- and long-term impact 
of economic conditions and policies on the evolution of the guarantee credit guarantee system. In 
this section, we depict the topological properties and financial characteristics of the guarantee 
network for 63 months (from January 2007 to March 2012) that cover the financial crisis in 2008 
and the implementation of the Chinese economic stimulus package.  
 
Fig. 2. Evolution of the guarantee network. 
 
 Fig. 3. Dynamics of the topological properties of the guarantee network. 
 
Fig. 4. Financial indexes of enterprises in the guarantee network. 
   The dynamics of the topological properties are presented in Fig. 3. Before the financial crisis 
occurred, the network density was decreasing because of the increase of nodes and edges. After 
Lehman Brothers bankrupted, the density increased slightly as many SMEs left the guarantee 
network (many of them also bankrupted). As discussed above, the stimulus package helped maintain 
the growth of the network, making the network density keep decreasing.  
  Fig.2 presents the evolution of the guarantee network. Fig.3 presents the dynamics of different 
topological properties of the guarantee network. In general, the guarantee network exhibits 
distinguished dynamic patterns in the four phases (defined in 4.1). We found that after the financial 
crisis began (marked by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers), the network size decreased, resulting 
in a more densely connected network. This indicated that the financial crisis caused large scale 
bankruptcy of small and less connected SMEs. The implementation of Chinese stimulus package 
immediately stopped the decrease. Since then, the network has been increasing (almost linearly), 
even after the end of the stimulus package. The Pearson correlation between the growth of network 
scale and the new loans data (retrieved from People’s Bank of China) also verified that the network 
size and amount of loans from banks are positively associated. The correlation coefficients between 
new loans and the counts of nodes and edges are 0.56 (p-value<0.001) and 0.58 (p-value<0.001), 
respectively. Similar pattern was also observed for the number of weakly connected components, 
and the size of the giant component. Interestingly, both the size of the network and the giant 
component, and the number of components, decreased a bit before the end of the stimulus package, 
and increased significantly right after it.  
Furthermore, we observed clear turning points within Phase 3, when the stimulus plan was being 
implemented. More interestingly, the turning points for most topological properties were the same, 
but different for a few properties. In the following, we focus on the description of these turning 
points, and the economic implications of them. 
The average degree, the exponent of the power-law in-degree distributions, average reciprocity, 
average ratio of fully connected 3-node-subgraph, and average clustering coefficient were 
increasing rapidly after the initiation of the stimulus plan. These values suddenly dropped in the last 
quarter of 2009, and quickly resumed the increasing trend until April 2010. Since then, all these 
values kept decreasing until the end of 2011 except a snap surge right after the end of the stimulus 
plan (December 2010). The exponent of the power-law out-degree distribution followed a similar 
pattern as above, expect that it did not drop significantly in April and May 2010.  
These findings indicated that there were a lot of new mutual guarantee relationships as a result of 
the stimulus plan. This included both mutual guarantees between two enterprises, and among three 
enterprises. Combining with the dynamics of the average assets and loans of the overall network 
(Fig.4), we found that these newly mutual guarantee relationships were mainly formed by 
enterprises that are with a low asset and low level of loans (p-value < 0.001 in both chi-square tests). 
A closer look at these mutual guaranteeing enterprises revealed that they were mostly (around 70%) 
not part of the giant component, but in other smaller isolated components. After the initiation of the 
stimulus plan, the inclusion of these small enterprises caused the surges of loans and the loan to 
asset ratio (as shown in Fig.4). This trend was turned over briefly in late 2009 because of the 
dynamic fine adjustment of the People’s Bank of China. However, the trend resumed in 2010, until 
the government and the People’s Bank of China started to improve the macro-control regulations by 
increasing the reserve requirement ratio for five times in 2010 (from 15.5% to 18%).  
Different from the other properties, the average shortest path length of the giant component kept 
increasing after the initiation of the stimulus plan until September 2010, after when the value kept 
decreasing. This pattern is the similar as the size of the giant component. These findings indicated 
that the core of the guarantee network was not influenced significantly by the changes in regulations, 
until September 2010, only one month before the People’s Bank of China increased the interest rate. 
This echoed the above finding that mutual guarantee relationships were mostly in smaller isolated 
components. 
  These turning points were well aligned with the changes of monetary policies and the practice of 
the stimulus plan.  
At the beginning of the stimulus plan, the monetary policy was too ultra-loose, the People’s Bank 
of China started the dynamic fine adjustment in the second half of 2009.  
In March 2010 (17 months since the initiation of stimulus plan), the government work report 
delivered at the 11th National People’s Congress stated that the government planned to improve 
macro-control regulations in 2010.  
Since then, the People’s Bank of China (the central bank of PRC) increased the Required Reserve 
Ratio for five times in 2010 (from 15.5% to 18%). The major change of the monetary policy 
operations occurred on Oct 20th, 2010, when the People’s Bank of China raised the interest rates for 
the first time since the global financial crisis. These regulations and policy changes, to some extent, 
helped reduce the impact of the negative consequence of the stimulus plan.  
 
5. Simulation test  
First, we need to make several notations before introducing the detailed contagion process. For 
each node i, we use Ai, Li and Gij to denote enterprise i’s asset, liability and loan guarantee amount 
from enterprise i to j. 
Furthermore, we use Fermi distribution model to characterize the probability of default failure. 
This logistic function is widely used in economics and finance [60, 61]. 
1
1 + 𝑒
−𝑘(
𝐿𝑖
𝐴𝑖 
−𝛿)
 
  In the above formula, k represents the macro market environment. The smaller k is, the much 
more likely this enterprise will be failed. The δ represents the mean value of the leverage ratio. We 
use Pi(t) to denote the probability that enterprise i defaults due to the contagion effect of all its 
defaulted neighbors at time t. So j are the default debtors who are guaranteed by enterprise i.   
P𝑖(t) =  
1
1 + 𝑒
−𝑘(
𝐿𝑖+∑ 𝐺𝑖𝑗
𝐴𝑖 
−𝛿)
 
As we can see from the expression of P𝑖(t), when enterprise i’s out-degree members get failure, 
all the loan guarantee will have to be the debt of enterprise i, so the default risk of enterprise i 
becomes higher. This is very intuitive. 
The simulation runs as follows. 
• To choose initial seed nodes to default. Randomly choose one, five and ten percent firms from 
guarantee network respectively as seed nodes. 
• At each time step t, a previously non-default enterprise i defaults at a probability P𝑖(t) defined 
above. 
• The dynamic terminates when there is no new enterprises default.  
We define four kinds of scenarios to choose seed nodes with k=1 and δ = 0.5 . First one is 
randomly to choose p ratio seed nods. Then in the left three scenarios, we do targeted selection of 
seed nodes, respectively choosing p ratio of seed node with the highest in-degree, most loan and 
most importance in the guarantee network. Here, the importance of enterprise i is the number of 
failed enterprise because of the failure of enterprise i. 
For each scenario, we choose a ratio of p (0.01, 0.05 and 0.10) enterprises as initially failed 
enterprises, then run our model with one monthly guarantee network for 10000 times. We record 
the final ratio of failed enterprises for each simulation, and then calculate the average values. The 
final results are shown in Fig. 6. 
 
 
Fig.6. Contagion in the guarantee network 
 
  From Fig.6, we can see under the four different scenarios, we can get a similar trend of the final 
ratio of contagion enterprises. At phase one, there is an increase-decrease trend. At phase three, there 
is an obvious increasing, which show the network structure become vulnerable. The extremely high 
contagion ratio at phase three indicate the stimulus plan has a negative effect on the resilience of 
guarantee network. 
6. Implications and conclusions 
 Our study contributes to the literature on guarantee network management through data-driven 
research. First, the previous studies mainly focus on the small-size guarantee network, so we are the 
first one to explore the large-scale Chinese guarantee network. In addition, China's bank regulators 
and policy makers have very little knowledge about entire Chinese guarantee network from the 
system level. Our study shows that network analysis can provide systemic insight into the whole 
guarantee network’s structure. Integrating these network indicators with enterprise information 
systems will enable timely identification of risks in the guarantee network, thus contributing to an 
in-depth understanding of Chinese guarantee system. Second, to our best knowledge, we are the 
first one to exam the roles of economic situation and state policy played on the structure of guarantee 
network from the network analysis perspective. Third, the study bridged the knowledge gap between 
policy evaluation and network analysis. We will help shed light on the role of Chinese economic 
stimulus program on the evolution of guarantee network. In addition, the present study examined 
enterprises’ interaction behaviors by analysis of clustering coefficient in the guarantee network, 
which prefer choosing friends’ friend to form new guarantee relationships.  
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